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A Lesson in Success
The Calonne Trench Raid, 
17 January 1917
Andrew B. Godefroy
“I hope that the C anadians are not in trenches opposite you, fo r  they on the d a rkes t night ju m p  
sud d en ly  into our trenches, causing great consternation a n d  before cries fo r  help can be answ ered  
disappear again into the d a rk n e ss .. , ”1
- From  a letter found on a cap tu red  G erm an soldier, 1917.
T ie Allied arm ies slugged it ou t on the Western front for nearly  four years before finally 
achieving the b reakou t sough t since November 
1914. The four-division strong  C anadian  Corps 
led th is  “spearhead  to victory.” Its com m ander 
w as L ieutenant-G eneral Sir A rthu r Currie, and  
his corps was commonly referred to as the “shock 
tro o p s” of the  B ritish  Expeditionary  Force and  
as “the  enem y’s elite so ld iers” by the G erm an 
high com m and. This rep u ta tio n  stem m ed from 
the  C an ad ian s’ im pressive record of success in 
raiding the G erm an lines throughout the war. The 
C anad ian  C orps’ flexibility, an d  initiative, the 
aggressiveness of its soldiers, an d  their ever 
improving skills of fire and movement continually 
added to the growing legend of C anad ians being 
m a s te rs  of th e  a r t  of the  tre n c h  raid . One 
operation in particular, a raid against the German 
lines along the Lens-B ethune railway no rtheast 
of Cite Calonne on 17 Ja n u a ry  1917, was alm ost 
flawless in its planning and preparation, and near 
text-book in its execution and  resulting  effect.
The trench raid was by no m eans a Canadian 
invention, b u t as h isto rian  Daniel G. D ancocks 
once wrote, “If [the C anadians] h ad  not initiated 
th is form of warfare, they certainly elevated it to 
an  a rt form .”2 T rench  raid ing h ad  originated as 
p a r t  of the B ritish  Expeditionary  Force (BEF) 
policy of m aintaining the offensive esprit de  corps 
and  avoiding the  m orbid m onotony of trench  
w a r fa re  by  c o n s ta n t ly  h a r a s s in g  a n d  
demoralizing the enemy. The British, “in contrast 
to the French, who w hen not engaged in a m ajor
offensive  te n d e d  to  o b se rv e  a n  u n o ffic ia l 
tru c e ,.. .em phasized the necessity  for continual 
aggressiveness in defence.”3 In February 1915 the 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry raided 
the  G erm an  lines opposite  th em  a n d  th u s  
undertook the first operation of w hat would later 
become a  tradem ark of the Canadian Corps.4 The 
C anad ian  staff soon realized the  advan tages of 
tren ch  raiding, and  after the  second ba ttle  of 
Ypres (April 1915) they im plem ented a  vigorous 
raiding policy.
The Allies sp en t the first m on ths of 1917 in 
extensive planning and preparation for the spring 
offensive. At the end of the previous year the 
F rench  high com m and h a d  decided to m ake a 
s tro n g  th ru s t  ac ro ss  the  A isne ra th e r  th a n  
continuing the battles of attrition on the Somme. 
In addition, G eneral Nivelle, com m anding the 
F rench, asked  Field M arshal Haig to con tinue 
w ith the p lanned  a ttack  sou th  of Arras, s tarting  
a few days in  advance of h is own m ain  a ttack . 
Haig agreed, b u t insisted  th a t h is a ttack  extend 
n o rth  to include the  Vimy Sector. Haig w as 
convinced th a t  only strong p ressu re  could force 
the G erm ans off the ridge. In Ja n u a ry  1917 th is 
area fell w ithin the British First Army Sector and 
was sitting  opposite the C anadian  Corps.5
E x ten siv e  ra id in g  by  C a n a d ia n  tro o p s  
preceded the a ttack  on Vimy Ridge. Almost every 
battalion was required to engage in some activity 
to gain  as m uch  inform ation abou t the enem y 
an d  fam iliarize its own troops w ith the ground.
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Played ou t like m in iatu re  versions of the  ac tual 
assau lt, by 1917 raids were m ounted in daylight 
ra th e r th an  u nder the cover of darkness like the 
year before. Since allied troops were fighting from 
w est to east, they also enjoyed a few hours more 
tw iligh t b e h in d  th em  w hile th e  r is in g  s u n  
silhouetted the G erm an positions. Furtherm ore, 
b y  1 9 1 7  r a id in g  p a r t i e s  h a d  in c r e a s e d  
dram atically in size com pared to the handfu ls of 
m en who undertook  earlier raids. Raiding and  
patrolling also kept the Germ ans nervous, forced 
them  to ab andon  their own forw ard posts  and  
patrolling, and  lim ited their ability to detect an  
a ttack  w hich was being p repared  against them . 
A series of ra id s were carried  o u t along the 
C anad ian  front right up  un til the day before the 
a s sa u lt  on Vimy Ridge, constan tly  testing  the 
G erm an defences and  keeping G erm an m orale 
low.
The m ost im portan t factor influencing the 
raiding concept was the geography of the western 
front. G eography h a d  a d irec t in fluence on 
survivability because  the te rra in  provided little 
in the way of n a tu ra l obstacles for either side to 
take advantage of. Much of Belgium and Flanders, 
w here the C anad ian  Corps fought its ba ttles, 
consisted  of low ridges, rolling hills, or wide 
expanses of flat open terrain . The m any wooded 
a reas  h a d  been  reduced  to little m ore th a n  a 
collection of b u rn t s tu m p s by con tinuous shell 
an d  m achine gun  fire. W ith little or no n a tu ra l 
cover, soldiers were forced to dig them selves into 
the ground to survive. Thus, w ithin a short while 
the  whole w estern  front consisted  of a series of 
in terconnected trenches protected  by row upon 
row of barbed  wire en tanglem ents and  m achine 
g u n s . A rtillery , m ac h in e  g u n s , or s n ip e rs  
m eticulously  covered every avenue of advance. 
In betw een the G erm an and  Allied arm ies was a 
narrow  strip of cratered and desolate terrain tha t 
w as com m only referred  to as “no m an ’s lan d ” 
due to the perception th a t it w as im possible for 
anyone to survive outside the trench lines for very 
long.
T renches developed as a re su lt of the  need 
for creating  defensive positions from w hich to 
repel enem y a ttacks  and  coun ter-a ttacks. Both 
sides created  an  extensive series of field works, 
well supplied  w ith sm all arm s, m achine guns, 
an d  suppo rted  by artillery, w hich led to the 
inability of e ither the B ritish or the G erm ans to 
con tinue  to m anoeuver. M anoeuverability was
vital to the  m ain tenance  of the  offensive, and  
w ithou t it, the  b es t e ither side could hope for 
w as to consolidate their p resen t gains.
M ost trenches  on the w estern  front were 
based  on a  sim ilar concept or pa tte rn . Trenches 
were construc ted  four to six feet in  w idth and  
approximately six to eight feet deep. Every trench 
was supposed  to have a fire step  and  pa rape t so 
th a t  the infantry  could fire a t the enem y and  be 
able to take  cover if necessary . T renches were 
also dug  in a zigzag p a tte rn  so th a t if the trench  
w as overrun  the  infiltrators could n o t fire their 
w eapons down the  length  of the  tren ch  an d  h it 
everyone a t  once. T re n ch e s  w ere no rm ally  
connected  to o ther p a rts  of the line and  to the 
r e a r  by  sm a lle r  c o m m u n ic a tio n  tre n c h e s , 
norm ally anyw here from th ree to five feet wide. 
Most trench  system s h ad  som e form of reveting 
and  cover, as well as traverses and  sandbagged 
tops and  sidings. G erm an tren ch  system s were 
often m uch better constructed and more complex 
th a n  allied lines, contain ing  m any in teresting  
featu res su ch  as deep elaborate dugouts, bom b 
sto res, an d  w ell-cam ouflaged sn ip ing  posts . 
These deadly s tru c tu re s  becam e the  priority  
targets of C anadian raiders and  for good reason. 
A single machine gun nest, well sited and m anned 
by an  efficient gunner, could easily h a lt the 
advance of an  entire battalion.
Beyond the trenches lay wire entanglem ents 
of every and  any  shape, strew n o u t across the 
en tire  w este rn  front, an d  often w ithou t any 
tactical considerations beyond local needs. Wire 
w as p laced on top of wire w here it h a d  been  
dam aged , cu t, or destroyed . Soon  a se a  of 
entanglem ent had  been created on bo th  sides of 
n o -m a n ’s-land . At first en tan g lem en ts  were 
situated  only a few m eters beyond the firing step, 
b u t they  were moved ou t from the  tren ch es to 
pu sh  enemy bom bers from throwing range. Often 
laid in successive belts and  constan tly  checked 
by w orking parties, wire w as very helpful in 
countering infiltration of any kind.
The Calonne Raid
Bully Grenay, a town northw est of Lens, had  oecome the reserve and  train ing area for the 
4 th  C anad ian  Infan try  Brigade (2nd C anad ian  
Division) in the w inter of 1916. Engineers of the 
4 th  Field Com pany under com m and of Major H.
Officers of the 21st (Eastern Ontario) Battalion, CEF, at Bully Grenay, 1917
St. A. Sm ith had  been tasked to begin work there 
on a full-scale m odel of the G erm an  tren ch  
s y s te m  in  th e  C a lo n n e  a r e a .6 B rig a d e  
h e ad q u arte rs  (HQ) h ad  p lanned  to conduct a 
large scale ra id  on the G erm an trenches ju s t  
no rth -east of Calonne for the middle of January , 
requiring  m en from the 20 th  (Central Ontario) 
an d  2 1 s t (E astern  Ontario) B attalions, as  well 
a s  eng ineers  from  the  4 th  (M ontreal) Field 
Com pany an d  o ther su p p o rt troops. The 20 th  
B atta lion  h a d  arrived a t Bully G renay on 28 
December, relieving the 18th (W estern Ontario) 
Battalion which was then  in the front lines.7 The 
2 1 s t B atta lion  arrived a few days later, and  
train ing  for the  raid  began alm ost immediately. 
Their operation  order la te r s ta ted , “The 21st 
B atta lion  a ttack ing  p a rty  will en te r the  enem y 
tre n c h .. .for the purpose of inflicting casualties, 
m aking prisoners, securing booty and  wrecking 
dugou ts  in  the  system  of trenches  in the  area 
a ttacked .”8
The raid  w as to employ som e 860 specially 
t r a in e d  tro o p s  in  to ta l ,  fo rm e d  in to  five 
operational com panies.9 C om m anding the  two 
com panies of the 20th  Battalion were Major C.C. 
W ansbrough w ith N o.l Com pany, an d  Major
H.W.A. Foster, MC w ith No.2 C om pany (he was 
a lso  overall co m m an d er of th e  raid). E ach  
com pany consisted  of four p latoons, an d  two 
s a p p e r s  fro m  th e  4 th  F ie ld  C o m p a n y  
a c c o m p a n ie d  e a c h  p l a to o n .10 T he  th re e  
com panies from the  21st B attalion were led by 
Major George S. Bowerbank (officer comm anding 
th e  2 1 s t  B a t ta l io n  e le m e n t) , C a p ta in  P. 
B rocklebank, an d  M ajor F.D. Raym ond. An 
a c c o u n ta n t from  th e  S a rn ia  b ra n c h  of the  
C a n a d ia n  B a n k  o f C o m m e rc e , G eo rge  
B ow erbank h a d  been  w ith  the  b a tta lio n  for 
alm ost th ree years, and  w as a very experienced 
officer.11 He h ad  already been  m entioned-in- 
despatches for displaying gallantry and  devotion 
to du ty  on m ore th a n  one occasion. Both Major 
Raym ond and  C apta in  B rocklebank h ad  seen  
extensive service a t the front as  well, proving 
them selves to be capable officers. U nder these  
leaders the  soldiers of the force were able to 
maximize success against the G erm ans.12
Men chosen  for the raid  sp en t a period of 
time out on aggressive patrols into no-m an’s-land 
to fam iliarize them selves w ith the terra in . This 
h a d  becom e s ta n d a rd  p rac tice , so th a t  the  
soldiers h ad  less chance of becom ing lost while
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on  th e  a c tu a l  ra id . It w as  a lso  a w ay  of 
‘c l im a tiz in g ’ th e  r a id in g  t ro o p s  w ith  th e  
environm ent in which they were going to conduct 
the operation. This helped to build the confidence 
of the individual soldier because he knew where 
he w as going and  w hat he w as supposed  to do 
a n d  w as b e tte r  able to carry  on sh o u ld  h is 
su p erio rs  becom e casu a ltie s . Patro lling  w as 
com plim ented by tra in ing  sessions on m odels 
constructed  by the engineers. On the m orning of 
5 J a n u a ry  1917, the  sap p ers  along w ith  the 
in fan try  w ent th ro u g h  the  dum m y G erm an  
trenches on a practice ru n  under the supervision 
of the Corps Com m ander.13 L ieutenant-G eneral 
Ju lian  Byng was satisfied tha t the m en were being 
p ro p e r ly  t r a in e d  a n d  lo oked  to w a rd s  th e  
operation with confidence in its success.
On 27 D ecem ber 1916 the  enem y wire w as 
com ple te ly  sc o u te d , a n d  th e  p ro c e d u re  of 
systematically destroying it began using m edium  
trench m ortars and stokes guns. The Left Group, 
2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, undertook this 
task. Enem y entanglem ents had  consisted of five 
or six rows of angle iron knife rests  closely laced 
together, and it was hoped tha t the artillery would 
satisfactorily destroy the wire prior to the ra id .14 
If not, m em bers of the first wave in the storm ing 
p latoons h a d  been  outfitted  w ith w ire-cutting  
attachm ents for their rifles. Lessons learned from
the  Douve River raid  the  previous November 
in d ic a te d  th e  im p o r ta n c e  of c o n d u c tin g  
reconnaissance  prior to an  a ttack . Too often 
raid ing  troops discovered rows of b arbed  wire 
th a t  w as supposed ly  destroyed  p rio r to the  
a s sa u lt  lying directly in  their p a th  of advance. 
T he e n s u in g  f ia sc o  a lw a y s  p ro v ed  to  be 
m urderous to the attackers. Therefore to confirm 
the dam age to G erm an wire reconnaissance  
p a tro ls  a n d  sc o u ts  w ere s e n t o u t to m ake 
inspections the evening prior to the raid, and  on 
retu rn ing  reported the artillery h ad  done its job.
For the raid, each  platoon was organized as 
a s e p a ra te  s to rm in g  p a rty , w ith  riflem en , 
b o m b ers , c a rr ie rs , w ire -c u tte rs , s tre tc h e r-  
bearers, and in the case of the second wave, Lewis 
g u n n e rs . In add ition  to th is , two eng ineers 
accom panied  each  p latoon , carry ing  mobile 
charges and gun-cotton for wrecking dugouts and 
em placem ents. One section of battalion bom bers 
was a ttached  to the two platoons on the extreme 
left f lan k , for th e  p u rp o se  of h o ld in g  th e  
im portan t block on the left in the  enem y front 
line. Six m en in  each com pany carried ten  No.23 
rifle grenades. Every company also h ad  four rolls 
of wire and  canvas slats, to throw over the enemy 
wire if it was necessary. Only the bare essentials 
were to be carried  by soldiers during  an  a ttack , 
b u t the  sappers on the  raid  found their loads to 
be quite  cum bersom e.15 In addition  to a rifle, 
bayonet, one h u n d red  ro u n d s of am m unition , 
and  ten  bom bs, the  sap p ers  were also carrying 
w ith them  ten  light ladders, each eight feet long, 
to be u sed  for bridging trenches or if necessary  
as s tre tch ers . Also on the  kit list were S tokes’ 
bom bs ad ap ted  for bom bing du g o u ts  an d  a 
n u m b er of ‘P ’ bom bs (sm oke).16 All the  ra iders 
stripped down their webbing, carrying only their 
bayonets, w ater bottles, an d  haversacks. Men 
wore the P.H. gas helm et in stead  of carrying the 
m ore cum bersom e box respirator.
Such  firepower an d  com bat su p p o rt was 
needed, for the opposition had  greatly improved 
its  s tre n g th . In  1914 a  G erm an  L a n d w eh r  
infantry  regim ent h ad  12 com panies of riflemen 
an d  one m achine gun  com pany (six m achine 
guns), and  no o ther supporting  un its . By 1917, 
the  nu m b er of m achine gun  com panies h ad  
tripled, lowering the ratio  of rifles to m achine
21st Battalion soldiers practice communications.
g u n  com panies in  G erm an u n its  from 1:12 to 
1:4. In m any cases Germ an regim ents could also 
obtain  additional defensive su p p o rt a round  key 
terrain  in the form of m achine gun  sharpshooter 
detachm ents, further lowering the ratio in a given 
p a r t of the  line to 1 :2 .17 There w as also an  
increased num ber of trench  m ortars, so th a t by 
1917, the G erm ans could form a platoon of two 
light tren ch  m orta rs  in  each  in fan try  ba tta lion  
(4 com pan ies). In te rm s  of co m m an d  in  a 
defensive battle, the  G erm an infantry  batta lion  
com m ander had  u nder h is control four infantry 
co m p an ies , a m ac h in e  g u n  com p an y  p lu s  
p o te n t ia l ly  m a c h in e  g u n  s h a r p s h o o te r  
detachm ents, and a light trench m ortar platoon.18 
Additionally, he could call on fire su p p o rt from 
artillery un its  supporting his p a rt of the line. Nor 
were his troops an  easy target. Instead of standing 
shoulder to shoulder in trenches as the G erm ans 
did in  1914, they  were now spaced  a p a rt and  
m u tu a lly  s u p p o r t in g  e a c h  o th e r  th ro u g h  
overlapping arcs of fire. In stead  of fighting over 
every inch of ground, in the defence the G erm ans 
secured  key terrain , allowed attacking  troops to 
b reak  th rough  loosely-held front line defences, 
and then engaging them  in the flank with machine 
gu n s and  field artillery. Followed up  by a  quick 
coun terattack , any b reak th roughs were sim ply 
ann ih ila ted . The G erm ans believed w ith these 
tactics they could effectively repel any attack. The 
C anadians were to prove them  wrong.
C anad ian  p lann ing  for the  ra id  h ad  been 
thorough. Consistent observation of the Germ an 
lines h a d  revealed m any of their m ach inegun  
em placem ents, trench  m ortars, and  d u g o u ts .19 
These were the prime targets. The Canadians had 
becom e well aw are of the G erm an defence-in­
d ep th  tactics. In stead  of a ttem p ting  u se less 
frontal a ssau lts  and  susta in ing  high casualties, 
the Canadians had learned to unravel the German 
defensive web by breaking it ap a rt one piece a t a 
time. Positions were either destroyed by artillery 
or isolated from their neighbours and  taken  out 
by in fan try  suppo rted  by engineers wielding 
satchel charges. As each position was taken  the 
G e rm a n  m u tu a l  s u p p o r t  w e a k e n e d , a n d  
eventually the whole defence melted away leaving 
a gap th rough  w hich troops could m anoeuver. 
C anad ian  in fan try  also h a d  learned  to screen  
their own flanks with machine gunners supported 
by  a r t i l le r y .  T h is  a llo w e d  fo r in c r e a s e d  
m a n o e u v e r  on  a n  o th e rw is e  im p a s s a b le  
battlefield.
In the pre-daw n hours of the 17 Ja n u a ry  the 
ra iders  moved into their positions. A ho t m eal 
w as served to all ran k s  a t 0400 h o u rs  an d  30 
m inutes later the troops left Bully Grenay to take 
up  th e ir positions in  the front line. The second 
wave of troops m oved in to  th e  bay s of the  
com m unications tren ch  leading into the  front 
line, an d  those in  the th ird  wave occupied the 
close su p p o rt trench . A bout 0715 h o u rs  all 
t ro o p s  r e p o r te d  th e y  w ere  in  p o s i t io n .20 
Conditions were quiet and  the enem y h ad  ju s t  
called their “s tand  down.” It was routine for both 
the B ritish  an d  the  G erm ans to be a t the  ready 
du ring  the daw n of each day, as m any a ttack s  
took place a t th a t  time. Seeing no im m ediate 
th reat, the detached G erm an posts and  sentries 
beg an  to go a b o u t th e ir  daily  r itu a ls  w hen  
suddenly  a t 0745 hou rs  the sky opened up  and  
shells poured  into the  G erm ans m ercilessly .21 
Parties of the 18th an d  19th B atta lions carried  
o u t d iversions on the  left flank  of th e  2 0 th  
b a tta lion  as the  a ssa u lt w ent in. The confused 
G erm ans were slow to react and  could not locate 
where the real attack was coming from. A barrage 
of sm oke w as laid in front of the assau ltin g  
troops, and favourable wind conditions gave great 
assistance in covering their advance. At zero hour 
plus 15 m inutes the 173rd Tunneling Company, 
Royal E ngineers, exploded a m ine n e a r  Double 
Crassier, an  im portant tactical feature well north  
of the actual attack. This effectively drew attention 
from the  real a ssa u lt as the G erm ans, th inking  
tha t the diversion by the 18th and 19th Battalions 
w as to be aga in st th is point, concen tra ted  their 
artillery fire there .22
Troops of the  first wave, covered in snow, 
poured out of their front line trench with lightning 
speed and  w ent forward th rough  ten  lanes th a t 
h ad  been  cu t in  their own wire. Surging across 
no-m an’s-land with great accuracy they reached 
the G erm an wire in less th an  five m inutes, while 
the artillery was still pounding the G erm an front 
line  w ith  sm oke a n d  s h ra p n e l .23 W eeks of 
p a tro llin g  a n d  g e tting  to know  th e  g ro u n d  
immediately paid off as the raiders reached their 
entry points with ease. Some recently laid barbed 
wire did little to slow up  the 20th Battalion which 
quickly cu t th rough  the obstacle w ith their rifle 
wire cu tters. Despite the in tense shelling, some 
of the enemy was still able to m an  their m achine 
g u n s , s p it t in g  ro u n d s  in to  th e  C a n a d ia n  
o n s la u g h t. However, th e  G erm an  fire w as 
ineffective an d  the  front line opposition was
3
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Left: A German concrete machine gun dugout 
captured by Canadian troops.
Above: Major F. Raymond, MC and bar, 21st 
(Eastern Ontario) Battalion CEF. He 
commanded “C” Company, in the Calonne 
Trench Raid.
Top: Canadian soldiers bring back German 
prisoners of war.
Regiment (1 s t Upper Silesian Infantry Regiment 
“Keith” of the 12th Reserve Division). Thirty-two 
m ore h a d  been  co u n ted  dead , p lu s  a large 
u n k n o w n  n u m b e r  th a t  w ere k illed in  th e ir  
dugouts. The G erm ans later reported  th a t their 
losses to talled  18 dead, 51 w ounded, and  61 
m issing. There is obviously som e discrepancy, 
for even if the ra iders  incorrectly  reported  the 
nu m b er of G erm ans killed, they did have over a 
h u n d red  p risoners in their possession , no t 61. 
C anad ian  casua lties  totalled 40 killed, m ost of 
w hich were suffered a t the beginning  of the 
a ssau lt, and  135 w ounded. For example, Major 
B ow erbank h a d  21 m en w ounded, four scou ts
w ounded, th ree  m en m issing, an d  one officer 
w o u n d e d , fo r a to ta l  o f 29  c a s u a l t i e s  
(approx im ate ly  25 p e rc e n t of h is  com pany  
strength  engaged). However, none of his wounded 
were serious, and  the  three m issing were later 
confirmed. Not a  single C anadian was left behind 
in the enem y lines.30
M ajor W.H.A. Foster MC, w as aw arded  the 
D istinguished Service O rder for h is ou tstand ing  
leadersh ip  in carrying ou t the raid. Meanwhile, 
Major Bowerbank received the Military Cross for 
h is leadersh ip  of the  2 1 s t B attalion. Sergeant 
Thom as G albraith  and  Private William C rerar of
■ r
the 21 st Battalion each were awarded the Military 
M edal, a s  w ere S a p p e r  H. A rnold  an d  h is  
team m ate, Sapper T. Conely. The latter pair had  
been  responsib le for a m ajority  of the  dam age 
cau sed  by the  sap p ers  ag a in s t the  G erm an 
defences.
Military Effectiveness
By definition, m ilitary  effectiveness is the p ro cess  by w hich  a rm ed  forces convert 
resou rces into fighting power.31 The C anad ian  
Expeditionary Force (CEF) excelled at honing this 
p rocess. U sing its  initiative, flexibility, and  
lessons learned  on the battlefield, the CEF was 
able to develop s ta n d a rd  operating  procedures 
th a t becam e a role m odel for the entire  B ritish  
Expeditionary  Force (BEF) and  its Allies. The 
m ilita ry  d o c tr in e  a n d  o p e ra t io n a l  o rd e rs  
developed by the  C anad ian  staff, b ased  on the 
extensive experience of its soldiers, w as widely 
c ircu la ted  th ro u g h o u t the en tire  BEF an d  the 
F rench  Army for in structiona l p u rp o ses .32 This 
e x te n s iv e  e x p e r ie n c e  w a s  g a in e d  from  a 
con tinuous series of trench  ra id s an d  m inor 
operations th a t  were carried  ou t aga in st the 
G erm an forces on the w estern  front. The trench  
raid , no ted  h is to ria n  Bill Rawling, “w as the 
laboratory” by which the C anadians developed a 
successful battlefield doctrine. Lessons learned 
in the field were immediately analyzed and where 
possible, used  to improve doctrine. Doctrine was 
th en  quickly d issem inated  back  to the  troops 
th rough  tra in ing  an d  sta ff exercises. The new 
principles becam e the  tac tics  th a t eventually 
b roke  th e  s ta le m a te  of tre n c h  w arfare  an d  
b rough t abou t a decisive victory aga inst the 
G erm an Army in the w est.33
The reasons for conducting raids and  small- 
scale operations were num erous. In addition to 
those reasons s ta ted  above, the  raid  acted  as a 
“m in i - v e r s io n ” of p o te n t ia l  la r g e r  s c a le  
operations. In 1914 the tactics used  by the British 
Army were of little use  in the environm ent of the 
w estern  front. Technology had  p u t an  end to the 
sim ple m assed  a ssa u lts  of the  Victorian age. 
Small arm s had  developed to such  an  extent tha t 
som e b ran ch es of the m ilitary (i.e. the Cavalry) 
were quickly becom ing obsolete fighting arm s. 
For example, the m achine gun  was “cheap, light, 
requ iring  few soldiers to m an  it and  firing 450 
ro u n d s  p e r m in u te  of relatively  lightw eight
am m unition which posed no very difficult supply 
problem ”.34 It was an  inexpensive investm ent and 
in re tu rn  the weapon sprayed a hail of direct fire- 
d ea th  w hich p u t an  end to a lm ost every m ajor 
offensive conducted  betw een 1915 an d  M arch 
1918. M any arm ies were literally ‘bled w hite’ 
before a lternatives were sought to the b ru ta l 
frontal assault.
By conducting  raid ing operations, tactics, 
equ ipm ent, and  tech n iq u es  could  be tes ted  
w ithout fear of large troop losses. The C anadians 
suggested th a t if techniques could be effectively 
developed to survive and  win a t trench  warfare, 
these could then  be developed fu rther on a large 
scale to b reak  the G erm an lines and  force a 
decision in  the  war. The ra id  h ad  o ther u ses  as 
well. It was an  effective way of testing the enemy 
defences an d  m easu ring  (and therefore also 
lowering) the morale of the enemy. Prisoners were 
taken , enem y u n its  were identified an d  enem y 
s tr e n g th s  w ere e s tim a te d . The c a p tu re  of 
docum en ts an d  equipm ent were im portan t for 
intelligence purposes. D uring the Douve River 
raid in November 1915 Canadian raiders secured 
“a prize to C anadian Intelligence Officers” in tha t 
the G erm an prisoners they took were all sporting 
a new ly developed  ru b b e rize d  g a s -m a s k .35 
Installations were destroyed, especially dugouts, 
saps and mines, and in general havoc was caused 
in th a t particu lar p a rt of the enemy line. Raiding 
also induced  the  enem y to send  forw ard his 
reserves, which enabled friendly artillery to shell 
them  and  cause further casualties. Raiding gave 
the artillery sufficient chances to practice  and  
improve its own techniques in registering targets 
and  coun ter-battery  fire. In the latter C anadian  
g u n n e rs  becam e experts, w hich served as an  
extremely valuable asse t in operations in  1918.
Doctrine and tactics evolved considerably due 
to the knowledge and  experience gained from 
raiding the G erm an lines. Raids h ad  taken  on a 
new  purpose. At first designed to sim ply ha ra ss  
the enem y an d  cause  som e dam age, by 1917 
raids were being used  as ‘on the job tra in ing’ for 
new  troops while honing  the skills of veteran  
soldiers. Raids h a d  also grown in size, from a 
few dozen m en of a single infan try  ba tta lion  to 
a lm o s t a th o u s a n d  tro o p s  from  all a rm s . 
C o m b in ed  a rm s  w a rfa re  w as so lid ified  in  
C anadian doctrine, and had become the example 
for all o th e r a rm ies  to follow. L ater on the  
im plem entation  of successfu l unit-level tactics
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enabled the C anadian Corps to take Vimy Ridge, 
the  m uddy flats of P asschendaele  in 1917, and  
to b reak  the  G erm an lines of defence in  1918. 
All th is  reflected well on the  C anad ian  Corps 
com m ander, L ieu ten an t G eneral S ir A rth u r 
Currie, who h ad  always encouraged his officers 
to th ink  and  use their initiative.
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